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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-
3(2)(d), from the final Judgment of the Fourth Circuit Court 
for Utah County, Orem Department, dated January 3, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter 
of law that there was no agreement between Herm Hughes & Sons, 
Inc. ("Herm Hughes") and Quintek for the sale of roof trusses 
either by the writings or the conduct of the parties? The 
standard of review is a correction of error standard. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 
744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); Bailev v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter 
of law that Quintek did not waive the ten-day acceptance 
requirement in its bid proposal by pursuing a contract with 
Herm Hughes after the ten days expired? Correction of error 
standard; see citations in paragraph 1. 
3. Are there sufficient undisputed facts for the Court 
of Appeals to rule as a matter of law that Quintek breached 
its agreement with Herm Hughes to furnish roof trusses for the 
project? Correction of error standard (see citations in 
paragraph 1) and power of appellate court to render judgment 
on the record before it. Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton 
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Sheep Co,. 776 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1989); Willis v. 
Kronendonk. 58 Utah 592, 200 P. 1025, 1031, 18 A.L.R. 947 
(1921); Avaikos v. Lowrv, 54 Utah 129, 179 P. 988, 990 (1919). 
4. Are there sufficient undisputed facts for the Court 
of Appeals to rule as a matter of law that Herm Hughes was 
damaged by Quintek's breach in the amount of $8,695.44? 
Correction of error standard and power to render judgment on 
record; see citations in paragraph 3. 
STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
DETERMINATIVE OF CASE 
The statutes whose interpretation will determine the 
disposition of the case are as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-711 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-712 
These and related statutes are set out in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case touches a sore spot with general contractors: 
subcontractors and suppliers who do not honor their bids. 
Herm Hughes and Sons, Inc., a general contractor, sued Quintek 
for breach of an agreement to supply wooden roof trusses on a 
project for construction of a school. 
Quintek submitted a written proposal to Herm Hughes for 
sale of the roof trusses. Herm Hughes gave Quintek a supplier 
agreement that contained some terms additional to those in 
Quintek's proposal. Quintek objected to the additional terms, 
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but the parties continued to discuss performance and Quintek 
provided shop drawings in response to Herm Hughes's request. 
After the shop drawings were returned by the architect for 
revision, Quintek told Herm Hughes it would not supply the 
roof trusses. Herm Hughes bought the trusses from another 
supplier and sued Quintek for the difference in cost. 
The action was tried to the trial court without a jury 
on August 13, 1990.1 At the trial, Herm Hughes presented 
evidence on the issues of contract, breach, and damages. 
Quintek defended on the grounds that there was no contract, 
and on the statute of frauds.2 On September 10, 1990, the 
trial court entered its Ruling dismissing the claim of Herm 
Hughes because, the court concluded, there had been no 
agreement formed between Herm Hughes and Quintek.3 After a 
hearing on December 5, 1990, regarding Quintek's Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment,4 the 
trial court entered its Judgment on January 3, 1991.5 Neither 
Record, page 125 (hereinafter abbreviated as, e.g., R. 
125) . 
Reporter's transcript of trial; as to breach and 
damages, see particularly page 78, line 7, through page 81, 
line 4 (hereinafter abbreviated as, e.g., T. 78 1.7 - 81 1. 
4). 
3R. 152. See Addendum. 
4R. 187. 
5R. 222. See Addendum. 
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the Ruling nor the Findings and Conclusions addressed the 
issues of breach or damages.6 
A statement of the facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review follows. 
Statement of the Facts 
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. (Herm Hughes) is a general 
contractor.7 Quintek is a manufacturer of wooden roof 
trusses. Quintek does not install the trusses or do work on 
the job site; it just sells them and delivers them to the 
project.8 In this case, however, Quintek failed to deliver 
the trusses.9 
In October 1983 Herm Hughes bid on the Midland 
Elementary School in Roy, Utah, for the Weber County School 
District.10 A bid service operated by the Intermountain 
Contractor (a trade publication) advertised the project, and 
The action was originally filed in the Second District 
Court for Weber County and by stipulation of counsel was 
transferred to the Fourth District Court for Utah County, and 
later, also by stipulation, was transferred to the Circuit 
Court. After a period of about two years' inactivity on the 
case, Herm Hughes brought the matter to trial. This 
procedurstl history is irrelevant to resolution of the issues 
on appeal but accounts for the passage of time since the 
occurrence of the events giving rise to the action. 
7Findings of Fact, No. 1, R. 232 (hereinafter abbreviated 
as, e.g., Finding 1). See Addendum. 
8Finding 2. 
9T. 78 11. 5-7. 
1 0Finding 3 ; T. 13 1 1 . 11 - 18; E x h i b i t s 6 and 1 1 . 
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Herm Hughes received bids from several truss suppliers to 
furnish the roof trusses.11 One of the bids was from Quintek.12 
On October 25, 1983, Quintek telephoned its bid in to 
Herm Hughes, then followed up the telephone call with a 
written bid proposal.13 The bid proposal contained the 
following terms: one lot wooden roof trusses per plans and 
specifications for $42,518.00, less an eight percent discount 
ten days, eleven days net, of $3,401.44. The bid included tax 
and f.o.b. job site "on the truck." The total amount of 
Quintek's bid, with the discount, was $39,116.56. Printed at 
the bottom of the bid proposal, with hand written insertions, 
are the words: "We agree to furnish all of the above items 
for the sum of SEE ABOVE FOB SEE ABOVE provided this estimate 
is accepted within JLO days from the above date." The bid 
proposal was signed by Don Brown as "Estimator."14 Quintek's 
president, Boyd Jacobson, was involved in preparing the bid 
and specifically approved it for submission to Herm Hughes.15 
Mr. Jacobson anticipated that, if Herm Hughes had signed the 
11Finding 3. T. 14 11. 8-22; 19 1. 21 - 21 1. 1. Exs. 2 
and 3. 
12Findings 3 and 4; T. 14 11. 23-25. 
13Finding 4; T. 15 11. 1-21; Exs. 1 and 6. 
uEx. 6. 
15T. 124 1. 2 - 125 1. 9. 
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bid proposal, Quintek would have received a written purchase 
order back in addition to the bid proposal.16 
Todd Walker was the project manager and estimator for 
Herm Hughes on the school project.17 He made a summary of all 
the low bids of the various subcontractors and suppliers,18 and 
used Quintek's bid in calculating Herm Hughes's bid on the 
school project.19 Herm Hughes was awarded the project.20 
A week or two after the project bid, Herm Hughes talked 
with Mr. Larry Gilson, an employee of another roof truss 
supplier, Oscar E. Chytraus Company, about its bid.21 
(Chytraus Company's bid was the low bid on the dollar amount, 
but it included a discount of only five percent.)22 Mr. Gilson 
interpreted Herm Hughes's inquiries as bid shopping and told 
Quintek about it.23 But Herm Hughes did not offer Oscar E. 
Chytraus a contract for the trusses.24 
16T. 141 11. 17-25. 
17T. 13 11. 9-10. 
18T. 19 11. 13-20; 23 11. 4-12. Ex. 7. 
19T. 23 1. 13 - 25 1. 7; Ex. 7. 
20T. 26 1. 14. 
21T. 117-123. 
22T. 122 11. 9-12. 
23Finding 8. T. 120 11. 3-5. 
24T. 123 11. 4-7. 
Herm Hughes did not sign Quintek's bid proposal.25 But 
during the period between the end of October and mid-November 
Herm Hughes prepared contracts for the many subcontractors and 
suppliers on the project, including a supplier agreement for 
Quintek.26 Herm Hughes prepared the supplier agreement for 
Quintek from t'erms contained in a contract summary form 
prepared by Todd Walker, based on Quintek's telephone quote 
and written confirmation proposal.27 Mr. Walker also prepared 
a shop drawing log, an advance planning schedule, and a list 
of subcontractors showing Quintek among other subcontractors 
and suppliers.28 
In mid November, 1983, Boyd Jacobson called Herm Hughes 
to ask why he hadn't received a contract.29 He was told by 
Todd Walker that Herm Hughes had not received a contract from 
the school district, and they couldn't give Quintek a contract 
until they did.30 A few days later,31 Mr. Jacobson went to the 
offices of Herm Hughes and had a conversation with Todd 
25Finding 7. 
26Ex. 9 (p. 2a); T. 29 - 30. 
27Ex. 10; T. 33 1. 24 - 34 1. 17; 36 11. 13-25. 
28Ex. 9 (pp. 2e, 2f, 2b, and 2c); T. 30 1. 14 - 33 1. 8. 
29T. 126 11. 4-16. 
30T. 126 11. 18-21. 
31T. 126 11. 24-25. 
Walker. Mr. Jacobson's testimony about that conversation is 
as follows: 
Q **nd what was the nature of that conversation? 
A I went up to their office to ask for a contract 
and pick up a set of plans that was up there. 
. . . 
Q To the best of your recollection, what was the 
nature of that conversation? 
A I asked Todd if he had a set of plans for us and 
he said yes. I said, do you have my contract ready. And at 
that time, he handed me a—he got in the file and handed me 
a supplier's agreement.32 
Herm Hughes also sent the supplier agreement to Quintek 
under cover of a letter dated November 21, 1983. The supplier 
agreement bears a date of November 15 and includes the 
following terms: materials are to be furnished f.o.b. job 
site, according to the specifications, and are to be 
manufactured by an I.C.B.O. approved shop; Quintek is required 
to submit shop drawings; Section 3 states the contract price 
of $42,518.00 and provides for monthly payments net of ten 
percent retainaae; Section 7 provides that in lieu of 
retainage, Quintek will "allow a discount of 8% ten days" to 
the contractor. Sections 1, 3, and 4 contain terms regarding 
T. 127 11. 1-3, 15-20. 
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Quintek being bound to the general conditions of the prime 
contract, retainage and payment, and liquidated damages.33 
Mr. Jacobson did not object to supplying the trusses 
per plans and specifications at the price shown on the 
supplier agreement, with a discount, or to manufacture by an 
I.C.B.O. approved shop, or to providing shop drawings.34 But 
he could not agree with some of the other additional terms. 
In particular, he objected to the part of Section 1 that 
obligated Quintek to Herm Hughes for the obligations Herm 
Hughes owed to the owner.35 He objected to the part of Section 
3 that allowed Herm Hughes to keep a ten percent retainage and 
to other payment terms.36 He objected also to the liquidated 
damages provision of Section 4.37 Mr. Jacobson voiced his 
objections about retainage to Todd Walker and told Mr. Walker 
he wouldn't sign the supplier agreement.38 
In the meantime, Don Brown, Quintek1s estimator, was 
keeping a progress log of the school project. In it he noted 
the name of the project, its address, the terms of Quintekfs 
bid, the name, address, and telephone number of the architect, 
33Ex. 11. 
34T. 147 11. 1-9; 148 1. 25 - 149 1. 23. 
35T. 145 11. 11-19. 
36T. 147 11. 11-25. 
37T. 129 1. 19; 148 11. 1-2. 
38T. 130 1. 7 - 131 1. 22. 
Herm Hughes, and the structural engineer, and recorded 
communications about the project. These communications span 
the period from November 30, 1983, to February 9, 1984.39 
On Herm Hughes's side, Todd Walker was keeping a shop 
drawing log and other records of communications with Quintek 
and other suppliers and subcontractors on the school project.40 
Todd Walker gave Quintek Plan Set No. 18 and Specification Set 
No. 18 on an unspecified date.41 On November 29 and December 
14, he called Quintek about the shop drawings.42 
On December 13, Boyd Jacobson sent "sealed drawings" 
for the project to Herm Hughes. At least the one drawing in 
evidence bears the seal of Fernando J. Sanchez, a registered 
professional engineer, with the date of 12/9/83 on the seal.43 
Todd Walker received these drawings on December 15,44 and 
forwarded them to E. W. Allen, the structural engineer for the 
project, for the engineer's approval.45 On December 20, Mr. 
Walker spoke with Don Brown at Quintek about the shop 
39EX. 20; T. 75 1. 21 - 76 1. 4; 142 1. 18 - 144 1. 3; 149 
1. 25 - 151 1. 5. 
40Ex. 8, T. 26 1. 12 - 29 1. 11; Ex. 9, T. 29 1. 12 - 33 
1. 18. 
41EX. 8. 




44Ex. 13; T. 43 1. 8 - 45 1.7. 
45Ex. 14; T. 45 1. 8 - 46 1. 14. 
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drawings, and on December 30, they had a conversation about 
beginning fabrication of the trusses.46 
On January 3, 1984, Todd Walker and Don Brown discussed 
the engineering of the trusses, specifically the feature of 
"1.33 x design load."47 On January 5, Herm Hughes received the 
shop drawings back from the architect48 and sent them to 
Quintek the next day.49 The letter of transmittal dated 
January 6, prepared by Todd Walker, bears the notation 
"Approved as noted," and the message to Quintek: "BEGIN 
FABRICATION! ALSO THE REMAINING SHOP DRAWINGS ARE LATE, 
PLEASE SUBMIT."50 
Quintek never began fabrication.51 On February 8 and 9 
Don Brown told Herm Hughes that Quintek would not honor its 
quote on the trusses and would not be supplying the trusses.52 
On February 8 or 9, Quintek discontinued its preparations of 
any work or its preparations to perform.53 
^Ex. 12; T. 40 1. 21 - 42 1. 6. 
47Ex. 12; T. 42 11. 12-25; 48 1. 22 - 49 1. 13. 
48Ex. 9; T. 32 11. 21-25. Ex. 16; T. 47 1. 15 - 48 1. 2. 
49EX. 9. 
50T. 33 11. 1-8. Ex. 17; T. 48 11. 3-16. 
51Finding 13; T. 132 1. 24 - 133 1. 1. 
52T. 60 1. 13 - 61 1. 22. (Ex. 18 was not received. See 
T. 67 11. 10-11.) 
53T. 135 11. 13-20. 
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On February 22, 1984, Bill North of Quintek hand 
delivered to Glenn Hughes, the president of Herm Hughes, a 
proposed Supplier Agreement.54 In the agreement, Quintek 
proposed to supply the trusses at a price of $48,000.00. The 
reasons given for the increased price included material costs 
that have "risen dramatically" from the bid date.55 (Quintek 
did not produce at the trial any evidence of the actual lumber 
prices at any point in time relevant to the case.) Mr. North 
informed Mr. Hughes that Quintek had to revise its estimate to 
meet the 1.33 design load required by the specifications.56 
Mr. Hughes did not sign the proffered agreement.57 
Quintek never did deliver the trusses to the project.58 
Herm Hughes contacted several truss suppliers in an effort to 
obtain the trusses for delivery in March or April of 1984.59 
Herm Hughes procured the trusses from an alternative supplier 
at a price of $47,812.00, which includes $97.26 for freight. 
The difference between that amount and the contract price 
quoted by Quintek is $8,695.44.60 
54Ex. 19; T. 72 1. 23-74 1. 9. 
55EX. 19. 
56T. 73 1. 20 - 74 1. 25. 
57T. 75 11. 5-7. 
58T. 78 11. 5-7. 
59T. 78-81. 
60Exs. 22 and 24; T. 78 1. 13 - 79 1. 16, 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I. The Uniform Commercial Code applies to this 
case. The court erred by concluding as a matter of law that 
there was no agreement between Herm Hughes and Quintek for the 
supply of roof trusses. The court apparently applied the 
"mirror image rule" from the common law of contracts to the 
issues of offer and acceptance. Had the court applied Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-207(1), which has modified the common law of 
offer and acceptance, the court would have found and concluded 
that a contract was formed by the written bid proposal of 
Quintek (offer) and the written supplier agreement of Herm 
Hughes (acceptance). The additional or different terms 
contained in the supplier agreement may not have been part of 
the agreement, but Quintek would have been bound to supply 
roof trusses according to its proposal. 
The trial court also concluded as a matter of law that 
the supplier agreement was untimely because it came after the 
10-day acceptance period in Quintek1s bid proposal. That 
conclusion was incorrect because Herm Hughes gave its supplier 
agreement to Quintek in mid-November when Quintek's president, 
Boyd Jacobson, went to Herm Hughes's office and requested it. 
Mr. Jacobson's request for a supplier agreement was either a 
waiver of the 10-day acceptance requirement or a renewal of 
Quintek's offer. The trial court's Conclusion No. 7, that 
there was no waiver, was error. 
13 
Point II. Even if Quintek's bid proposal and Herm 
Hughes's supplier agreement did not form an agreement, the 
parties' conduct recognized the existence of a contract for 
sale under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207(3). The conduct was by 
both parties and included actions and communications between 
them that were material to Quintek's performance. The 
contract consists of the terms on which the bid proposal and 
the supplier agreement agree, which are the essential terms 
for the sale of roof trusses, together with supplementary 
terms incorporated under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
Point III. There are sufficient facts on the record 
for this Court to determine that Quintek breached its 
agreement and that Herm Hughes is entitled to damages under 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-712 in the amount of $8,695.44. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court Erred in Concluding as 
a Matter of Law that there was No 
Agreement Between Herm Hughes and 
Quintek for the Supply of Roof 
Trusses where the Writings of the 
Parties Formed a Contract Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207(1). 
A. Article Two of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code applies to the 
transaction between Quintek and Herm 
Hughes. 
Held the trial court applied Article Two of the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code, the result would have been different. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-102 states that Chapter 2 "applies to 
transactions in goods." "'Goods1 means all things (including 
14 
specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time 
of identification to the contract for sale . . .." Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-105. The wooden roof trusses that Quintek was to 
have manufactured for the school project were to have been 
supplied as finished products without doing work on the 
jobsite. Quintek1s bid proposal included shipping the trusses 
to the project site. The trusses are therefore goods and the 
transaction is a transaction in goods for purposes of Article 
Two. 
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-2-207(l) provides: 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of 
acceptance or a written confirmation which is 
sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms 
additional to or different from those offered 
or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly 
made conditional on assent to the additional or 
different terms. 
Quintek's written bid proposal (Exhibit 6) was an offer. It 
contained the essential terms of a contract to supply the roof 
trusses for the project: f.o.b. jobsite, per plans and 
specifications, for a price of $42,518.00, less an eight 
percent discount of $3,401.44, if taken in ten days, for a net 
proposal of $39,116.56. 
Herm Hughes's supplier agreement (Exhibit 11) was a 
"definite . . . expression of acceptance." The supplier 
agreement set forth clearly and in writing the essential terms 
of Quintek's bid proposal: Quintek was to supply trusses for 
the project, f.o.b. jobsite, according to the plans and 
15 
specifications for the project, at a price of $42,518.00, with 
provision for a discount of eight percent if taken in ten 
days. Herm Hughes's supplier agreement met Quintek's bid 
proposal on all essential terms of the proposal. It was no 
less definite than Quintek's offer. 
Herm Hughes's supplier agreement was a "seasonable 
expression of acceptance." Section 70A-l-204(3) states: 
"An action is taken 'seasonably' when it is taken at or within 
the time agreed or if no time is agreed at or within a 
reasonable time." Although Quintek's written bid proposal 
requested acceptance within ten days, there was no agreement 
for acceptance within that period. Todd Walker explained to 
Boyd Jacobson in mid-November that the reason Herm Hughes had 
not given the supplier agreement to Quintek earlier was that 
Herm Hughes had not received its agreement from the school 
district. When Mr. Jacobson went to Herm Hughes's office "a 
few days later," Todd Walker gave him the supplier agreement 
on the spot. Herm Hughes also mailed the supplier agreement 
to Quintek under cover of Todd Walker's letter dated November 
21 (Exhibit 11). By the standard of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-1-204(3), which is the applicable standard, these 
actions were taken "within a reasonable time." 
The trial court made no finding of fact regarding the 
timeliness of the supplier agreement, other than Finding No. 
9, which states that Exhibit 20 "gives reason to believe" that 
Exhibit 11 was received by Quintek on or about November 30, 
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1983. The court's finding does not state that Quintek did not 
receive the supplier agreement before that date. Nor does it 
negate the testimony of Quintek's own president, that he 
received a supplier agreement when he asked for it "a few 
days" after mid-November. 
The trial court did, however, conclude as a matter of 
law that the supplier agreement was "untimely." Conclusion 
Nos. 2 and 6. The court did not, however, explain what legal 
standard it applied. The correct standard is derived from 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-1-207(1) and 70A-1-204(3). Even if the 
court's conclusion could be construed as a finding of fact, it 
is clearly erroneous. It ignores Mr. Jacobson's testimony of 
Todd Walker's explanation that Herm Hughes had not itself 
received its contract from the owner before mid-November. It 
ignores the fact that Mr. Jacobson, himself, requested a copy 
of the contract a few days later. It ignores the fact that 
upon requesting a contract, he received one. 
B. Quintek waived the ten-day 
acceptance requirement in its bid. 
The court's characterization of the supplier agreement as 
"untimely" probably stems from the provision in Quintek1s bid 
proposal that it must be accepted within ten days of October 
25, and the fact that Herm Hughes did not endorse its 
signature on the proposal. The trial court's ruling dated 
September 10, 1990, contains the following references that 
indicated the court's emphasis on the ten-day limit: 
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That cost estimate contained a provision that 
it be accepted within ten days of its date, and 
also contained a blank space for such 
acceptance to be endorsed therein with the 
<?ite. . . . The one fact that comes through 
tnis haze is that the original cost estimate 
had no acceptance endorsed on it within the ten 
days required by its terms, and there is no 
document showing acceptance within that period 
of time. Certainly plaintiff could have easily 
met the conditions reguested and avoided all 
the problems which have ensued. 
(Emphas is added.) 
The trial court's conclusion that the supplier 
agreement was untimely overlooks a critical set of facts. The 
ten-day period for accepting Quintek's proposal would have 
ended on November 5. Yet, in mid-November, Mr. Jacobson 
called Herm Hughes to ask for a contract. Informed by Todd 
Walker that Henri Hughes couldn't give him a contract yet, Mr. 
Jacobson went personally to Herm Hughes's office a few days 
later to pick up a set of plans and to ask again for a 
contract. This conduct has important legal implications. It 
is either a waiver of the ten-day acceptance period or a 
renewal of Quintek's offer. 
The trial court made no findings on the subject of 
waiver of the acceptance period. The court's Conclusion 
No. 7 recites there was no waiver but gives no explanation for 
its conclusion. 
This Court has established the elements of waiver. In 
B. R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Service, Inc., 
754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988), the Court stated: 
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Waiver is "the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right." Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d at 
123 0. To waive a right there must be an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage; 
knowledge of its existence; and an intention to 
relinquish it. Id. The party1s actions or 
conduct must unequivocally evince an intent to 
waive or must at least be inconsistent with any 
other intent. Id. 
754 P.2d at 101. A waiver may be express or implied. 
American Savings & Loan Association v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 
289, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968), citing Phoenix Insurance Co. v. 
Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 106 ALR 1391 (1936). 
Boyd Jacobson was the president of Quintek. Quintek 
had asserted a right under its bid proposal to require 
acceptance within ten days. Certainly Mr. Boyd Jacobson knew 
of that right. He was involved in preparing the written bid 
(Exhibit 6) and specifically approved the bid for submission 
to Herm Hughes. He was looking for a contract. He expected 
to receive a contract even if Herm Hughes had signed the bid 
proposal. Mr. Jacobson's conduct in mid-November and shortly 
thereafter evinces a clear intent to waive the ten day 
requirement. 
This case is similar to that of Swisher v. Clark, 2 09 
P.2d 880 (Okla. 1949). That case involved a contact for the 
sale of land pursuant to a written offer to purchase that 
contained the clause "This offer is withdrawn unless accepted 
by noon 4-10-46." Seller failed to accept the offer by April 
10. Nevertheless, the buyer personally went to the seller's 
home on April 15, where the seller signed the contract for 
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sale. Seller failed to convey and buyer sued for specific 
performance. The seller argued that because the contract was 
not signed until April 15, neither the buyer nor the seller 
was bound. The court observed: 
. . . this provision was put into the contract 
by [buyer] for his own benefit, and . . . by 
his conduct he had waived it. Certainly, when 
[buyer] told [seller] that he wanted her 
signature to the contract, that constituted a 
renewal of his offer. We further find that the 
evidence is sufficient to show that [buyer] 
knew full well that his offer expired on April 
10, but that he still desired to go through 
with the transaction. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, 
§ 42, at page 379, makes this statement: 
"As to time of acceptance. It is not 
essential that the acceptance be simultaneous 
with the offer; but where the offer specifies a 
time of acceptance, and acceptance after that 
time will be nugatory as an acceptance, unless 
the offerer assents thereto with full knowledge 
that it was not made within the period named. * 
* *" United States Cutlery Co. v. Hawkins, 17 
La. App. 395, 136 So. 127. 
209 P.2d at 885. 
By requesting a contract after the acceptance period 
had passed, Quintek waived the requirement that Herm Hughes 
accept the proposal within the ten-day period. Mr. Jacobson's 
conduct can also be construed as a renewal of Quintek1s offer. 
Herm Hughes accepted the offer immediately by handing Mr. 
Jacobson a supplier agreement and by mailing it shortly 
thereafter. 
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C. The supplier agreement formed a 
contract even though it contained 
terms "materially different" from 
Ouintek's original proposal. 
The trial court's Conclusion No. 6 states that the 
supplier agreement "was materially different than defendant's 
original proposal." The court based its conclusion that 
there was no agreement partly on these differences between the 
offer and the acceptance. It appears from the record that the 
trial court was proceeding under the erroneous assumption that 
the common law mirror image rule applied to this transaction. 
The court's Ruling states: 
The written cost estimate was never accepted by 
any endorsement thereon by plaintiff or its 
agents. A supplier's agreement bearing a date 
of November 15, 1983, appears to have been 
submitted to defendant by plaintiff sometime 
near the end of the month, but defendant found 
its terms unacceptable and so advised 
plaintiff. The project went forward with 
plaintiff believing it had a firm agreement for 
the trusses, and defendant protesting that it 
could not proceed with the ordering of 
materials and the manufacturing of the trusses 
until it had an acceptance of its cost estimate 
as submitted. 
The presence, in an acceptance, of terms that are additional 
to or even different from the terms in the offer is not fatal 
to the formation of a contract for the sale of goods under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Utah Code Annotated § 70A-2-207(l) 
specifically states: 
A definite and seasonable expression of 
acceptance or a written confirmation which is 
sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms 
additional to or different from those offered 
or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly 
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made conditional on assent to the additional or 
different terms. 
Even if, under § 2-207(2), the additional or different terms 
are so material as to alter the contract, such terms do not 
negate the existence of a contract; they simply do not become 
part of the contract. 
Appellant's research has not disclosed any Utah cases 
directly addressing the application of subsection 1 of Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-207. But the Utah Supreme Court in Johnson 
Tire Service, Inc. v. Thorn. Inc.. 613 P.2d 521 (Utah 1980), 
gave some indication of the way it would interpret the 
operation of subsection 1. In Johnson Tire, the buyer placed 
orders with Johnson Tire, the seller, and sent an agent to 
accept delivery, which was accompanied by a sales receipt. 
The parties treated the sales receipt as an acceptance. The 
seller altered the form of the sales receipt to include a 
provision, for attorneys' fees. When the buyer failed to bring 
its account current, the seller brought an action and claimed 
attorneys' fees. The trial court granted summary judgment for 
the seller for the balance due, but denied attorneys' fees on 
the grounds of Utah Code Ann. § 2-207(2)(b), that the 
attorneys' fees materially altered the sales contract. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, applying subsection 2 of 
Section 2-207 to decide that attorneys' fees were not part of 
the contract. What is relevant for this case is that the 
Supreme Court determined there was a contract: 
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We therefore hold that the contract in the 
instant case was formed on the defendant's 
(offeror's) terms and not plaintiff's 
(seller's) insofar as the attorneys' fees issue 
is concerned• 
Id. at 523. The Supreme Court explained the operation of 
Section 2-207: 
The foregoing statute departs from the common 
law counteroffer rule in that it construes 
additional or different terms contained in the 
acceptance as proposals to modify the contract 
which, as between merchants, become part of the 
contract unless "(a) the offer expressly limits 
acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they 
materially alter it; or (c) notification of 
objection to them has already been given or is 
given within a reasonable time after notice of 
them is received." 
Id. 
Other courts that have directly considered the effect 
of subsection 1 of § 2-207 on contract formation have held or 
stated in dictum that what under the common law would be 
counteroffers were valid acceptances forming binding 
contracts. Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General 
Electric Co.. 585 F.Supp. 1097, 1104 (E.D.Pa. 1984) ("The 
purpose of this section is to avoid the rigidity of common law 
theory of contracts that requires an acceptance to be a mirror 
image of the offer. Because the common law concept was 
outdated insofar as it ignored the modern realities of the 
preprinted form and modern business practices, it tended to 
frustrate business purposes."), opinion modified, 588 F.Supp. 
1280 (1984) (applying the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial 
Code); Earle Industries, Inc.. 88 B.R. 52 (E.D.Pa. 1988) 
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(applying Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code); Dorton v. 
Collins & Aikman Corp.. 453 F.2d 1161, 1165 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(applying the Uniform Commercial Codes of Georgia and 
Tennessee; " . . . it is clear that § 2-207, and specifically 
Subsection 2-207(1), was intended to alter the "ribbon 
matching" or "mirror" rule of common law, under which the 
terms of an acceptance or confirmation were required to be 
identical to the terms of the offer or oral agreement, 
respectively."); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinahouse Electric 
Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying Idaho 
Uniform Commercial Code; "Section 207, however, rejects the 
"mirror image" rule, and converts a common law counteroffer 
into an acceptance even though it states additional or 
different terms."); Steiner v. Mobile Oil Corp.. 141 Cal. 
Rptr. 157, 569 P.2d 751 (Cal. In Bank 1977); Boese-Hilburn Co. 
v. Dean Machinery Co., 616 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. App. 1981). 
The official comments to § 2-207 provide in part: 
1. This section is intended to deal with 
two typical situations. The one is the written 
confirmation, . . . The other situation is 
offer and acceptance, . . . A frequent example 
of the second situation is the exchange of 
printed purchase order and acceptance 
(sometimes called "acknowledgment") forms. 
Because the forms are oriented to the thinking 
of the respective drafting parties, the terms 
contained in them often do not correspond. 
Often the seller's form contains terms 
different from or additional to those set forth 
in the buyer's form. Nevertheless, the parties 
proceed with the transaction. 
2. Under this Article a proposed deal 
which in commercial understanding has in fact 
been closed is recognized as a contract. . . . 
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See also J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 
1-2, at 27, and § 1-3, at 29-30 (3rd ed. 1988), and Boyce, 
"The Uniform Commercial Code in Utah," 9 U.L.Rev. 904, 912 
(1965). 
In Boese-Hilburn Co,, supra, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals was faced with a question of first impression: 
whether a quotation constituted an offer and a purchase order 
constituted an acceptance in the context of UCC § 2-207(1). A 
buyer of equipment brought an action against the seller for 
damages for breach of express warranty. Buyer relied upon a 
warranty in its purchase order that was inconsistent with one 
of the terms of the quotation submitted by the seller. By 
reviewing the purpose and operation of § 2-207, the Court 
concluded that buyer's purchase order was a definite and 
seasonable acceptance and operated as an acceptance even 
though it contained a term additional to or different from 
that contained in the offer. The Court then resolved the 
question of the warranty by resort to Subsection 2-207(2), as 
the Utah Supreme Court did in Johnson Tire Service. 
Two cases applying § 2-207(1) in the construction 
context are instructive. In Chicopee Concrete Service, Inc. 
v. Hart Engineering Co., 20 Mass. App. 315, 479 N.E.2d 748, 42 
UCC Rep. Serv. 375 (1985), the Massachusetts Appeals Court 
held that a general contractor's purchase order formed a 
contract for the sale of concrete for a construction project. 
In Chicopee. defendant Hart Engineering was awarded a prime 
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contract for construction of a waste water treatment plant. 
In preparing its bidf Hart used prices for concrete that had 
been submitted to it by plaintiff, Chicopee, a concrete 
supplier* By letter to Hart dated September 12, 1978, 
Chicopee quoted prices which Hart used in calculating its bid 
on the project. The owner did not award Hart the prime 
contract until December 20, 1978. Hart did not send its 
purchase order to Chicopee until January 25, 1979. It appears 
from the reported opinion that the purchase order contained 
terms additional to or different from Chicopeefs price 
quotation. In response to the purchase order, Chicopee added 
qualifications to two of the terms of the purchase order, 
which it then signed and delivered to Hart on March 19, 1979. 
The trial court concluded that an enforceable contract 
was formed between Chicopee and Hart upon the issuance of 
Hart's purchase order of January 25, 1979. The appeals court 
affirmed over Hart's argument that, because Chicopee changed 
the terms of the purchase order, there was no acceptance by 
Chicopee, and hence, no contract. The appeals court stated: 
As we read G.L.c. 106, § 2-207(1) and (2), 
Chicopee's insertions only raise the question 
whether those terms become parts of the 
contract between Hart and Chicopee. . . . 
Although that question may or may not be 
relevant to the issue of damages . . . , it 
does not alter the fact that there was a valid 
contract between Hart and Chicopee. 
42 UCC Rep. Serv. at 378 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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In J, Baranello & Sons v. Hausmann Industries, Inc., 
571 F.Supp. 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), the general contractor sued a 
supplier for breach of a supply contract. In October 1976, J. 
Baranello & Sons, the general contractor, prepared and 
submitted a bid for construction of a state facility. In so 
doing, it relied on a bid quoted by Hausmann Industries, a 
subcontractor, for the fabrication and delivery of wardrobes. 
Hausmann1s proposal deviated from the plans and 
specifications, and those deviations were the subject of 
meetings and correspondence between Baranello and Hausmann. 
The negotiations culminated in letters exchanged in April 
1977. The district court concluded that Baranello's April 
letter was an offer and Hausmann1s April letter was an 
acceptance and that a contract was formed pursuant to New 
York's version of UCC § 2-207. The court stated: 
Under that section, a contract is formed by an 
exchange of correspondence if the documents 
demonstrate agreement on the essential terms of 
the parties' bargain. J. White & R. Summers, 
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-2, at 27 (2d Ed. 
1979). 
571 F. Supp. at 338. 
Under the Utah Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207(1), 
Quintek and Herm Hughes had a contract for the supply of roof 
trusses. It is not critical to the decision on appeal whether 
the provisions for retainage, liquidated damages, and other 
terms to which Quintek objected became part of the contract. 
(There was no evidence at the trial that the supplier 
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agreement was expressly made conditional on Quintek's assent 
to these additional or different terms.) The contract was 
that Quintek would supply roof trusses according to plans and 
specifications for the project, f.o.b. jobsite, at a price of 
$42,518.00, less an eight percent discount, if taken in ten 
days, of $3,401.44, for a net amount of $39,116.56. 
II 
As an Alternative, a Contract was 
Formed by the Conduct of Quintek and 
Herm Hughes Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-207(3). 
Consistent with the Uniform Commercial Code's expansion 
of the concepts of contract formation, a number of sections of 
Article Two provide that the parties may form a contract 
through conduct rather than merely through the exchange of 
communications constituting offer and acceptance. Among the 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code that allow for 
formation of contracts partly or wholly on the basis of 
conduct rather than merely through the exchange of 
communications constituting offer and acceptance are Section 
2-204 and subsection 3 of Section 2-207. J. White and R. 
Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-2, at 27 (3d ed. 1988). 
Cases and commentators suggest that where there have been 
writings of the parties in which the parties failed to reach 
an agreement, § 2-207(3) applies. Absent such writings, "2-
207(3) is inapplicable and the proper analysis focuses on 2-
204." IcL. § 1-3, at 43. 
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In the present case, the parties exchanged writings, 
particularly Quintek's bid proposal and Herm Hughes's supplier 
agreement. If this Court determines that those writings do 
not constitute a contract under the terms of § 2-207(1) or 
otherwise, then Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207(3) applies. That 
subsection provides: 
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of a contract is sufficient to 
establish a contract for sale although the 
writings of the parties do not otherwise 
establish a contract. In such case the terms 
of the particular contract consist of those 
terms on which the writings of the parties 
agree, together with any supplementary terms 
incorporated under any other provisions of this 
act. 
At least the following examples of conduct by the 
respective parties recognize the existence of a contract for 
the sale of the roof trusses. 
1. Herm Hughes typed up a supplier agreement from a 
contract summary form prepared by Todd Walker based on the 
terms of Quintek's bid. 
2. A few days after mid November, 1983, Boyd 
Jacobson, the president of Quintek, went to Herm Hughes's 
office to pick up a set of plans and to request a contract. 
He was given a supplier agreement, and later, a supplier 
agreement was sent by mail. 
3. Todd Walker gave Quintek a set of plans and 
specifications and noted that fact in his plan list. 
29 
4. Todd Walker prepared a shop drawing log with 
entries for communications with Quintek about shop drawings. 
The first communication was on November 29, 1983• 
5. Quintek's Don Brown wrote up and kept a progress 
log for the Midland School Project. The progress log 
contained project information and entries reflecting contacts 
between Quintek and persons associated with the project by 
date and summary. The entries span the period between 
November 30, 1983, and February 9, 1984. 
6. Quintek sent an initial shop drawing for the 
project to Herm Hughes under cover of a letter from Boyd 
Jacobson dated December 13, 1983. 
7. On December 14, 1983, Todd Walker, an employee of 
Herm Hughes, spoke with a person at Quintek's office regarding 
sending the shop drawings to Mr. Walker. 
8. On December 15, 1983, Herm Hughes received the 
shop drawing sent by Quintek and forwarded it to E. W. Allen & 
Associates, the engineer for the project, for the engineer's 
review. 
9. On December 20, 1983, Todd Walker spoke with Don 
Brown at Quintek about the shop drawings. 
10. On December 30, 1983, Todd Walker spoke with Don 
Brown recjarding starting fabrication of the trusses. 
11. On January 3, 1984, Todd Walker spoke with Don 
Brown about the design load for the plates of the trusses. 
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12. On or about January 6, 1984, Todd Walker sent back 
to Quintek a shop drawing "approved as noted" with the request 
to begin fabrication and to submit the remaining shop 
drawings. 
13. Not until February 8 or 9, 1984, did Quintek cease 
its preparations to perform the work. 
These are substantial steps and relevant to performance 
of the contract. The foregoing conduct is similar to conduct 
of the parties in Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. 
General Electric Co., 585 F. Supp. 1097, 1108 (E.D.Pa. 1984), 
that was sufficient to establish a contract under 
§ 2-207(3). 
The trial court's Conclusion No. 5 focused on partial 
performance, which is more relevant to the statute of frauds 
in Section 2-201 than to Section 2-207. But the trial court 
made no findings or conclusions on the statute of frauds. 
Although raised by Quintek, that was not an issue addressed by 
the court in its Ruling. 
The court's Ruling shows that the court was influenced 
in its thinking about the conduct of the parties by the fact 
that Herm Hughes proceeded "believing it had a firm agreement 
for the trusses" without accepting Quintek's cost estimate "as 
submitted." The court attributed the course of dealing 
between the parties more to Quintek's desire for a contract 
and its accommodating attitude than to an intent to perform. 
But those are subjective factors. The legal standard 
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specified by Section 2-207(3) is not subjective intent, but 
conduct. Outwardly Quintek was moving forward with the 
contract, right up to the date in early February when it 
ceased its preparations and announced it would not honor its 
bid. 
The terms of the contract established by the parties' 
conduct consist of those terms on which Quintek's bid proposal 
(Exhibit 6) and Herm Hughes' Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) 
agree, together with terms imposed by the Uniform Commercial 
Code such as those regarding warranties, which are not 
relevant to recovery in this case. The terms on which the 
writings agree are the essential terms for the supply of the 
roof trusses: Quintek would supply roof trusses to Herm 
Hughes per plans and specifications, f.o.b. job site, at a 
price of $42,518.00, less an eight percent discount, if taken 
in 10 days, of $3,401.44, for a net amount of $39,116.56. 
Ill 
This court has the power to determine 
that Quintek breached its agreement 
and that Herm Hughes is entitled to 
damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-712. 
An appellate court has the power to render judgment on 
the record before it if the evidence in the record is 
undisputed and there is sufficient material in the record for 
the appellate court to fairly and properly resolve the case on 
the record. Flying Diamond Oil v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 
618, 622 (Utah 1989); Willis v. Kronendcnk, 58 Utah 592, 200 
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P. 1025, 1031, 18 A.L.R. 947 (1921). Where facts are 
undisputed, the question of whether or not they constitute a 
performance or breach of a contract is one of law. Avaikos v. 
Lowrv. 54 Utah 129, 179 P. 988, 990 (1919). 
In this case there are sufficient undisputed facts for 
this Court to rule on the issues of breach and damages. The 
trial court made no findings or conclusions on those issues, 
relying entirely on its conclusion that there was no contract. 
With regard to breach, Finding 13 does, however, 
confirm that Quintek never began fabrication of the trusses 
and never produced any of the trusses for the school project. 
It is undisputed that Quintek never delivered trusses to the 
job. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-711 provides: 
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery 
. . . then with respect to any goods involved, 
. . . the buyer may cancel and whether or not 
he has done so may in addition to recovering so 
much of the price as has been paid 
(a) "cover" and have damages under 
the next section as to all the goods 
affected whether or not they have 
been identified to the contract; 
*** 
Section 70A-2-712 provides: 
(1) After a breach within the preceding 
section the buyer may "cover" by making in good 
faith and without unreasonable delay any 
reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase 
goods in substitution for those due from the 
seller. 
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller 
as damages the difference between the cost of 
cover and the contract price together with any 
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incidental or consequential damages as 
hereinafter defined (Section 70A-2-715), but 
less expenses saved in consequence of the 
seller's breach. 
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover 
within this section does not bar him from any 
other remedy. 
Herm Hughes promptly effected cover by contracting with 
a third party for the purchase of trusses. The difference 
between the cost of this cover and the contract price, 
together with some incidental freight charges, was $8,695.44. 
There was; no dispute about this evidence and it was received 
by the trial court subject only to Quintek's objection on the 
measure of damages. Quintek objected to the difference 
between Quintek's bid, as discounted, and the amount paid to 
the substitute truss supplier.61 Of course, it is not possible 
to determine whether Herm Hughes would have taken the discount 
because the trusses were never delivered.62 Where it was 
Quintek's failure to deliver the trusses that made it 
impossible to determine whether Herm Hughes would have taken 
the discount, Herm Hughes should be entitled to its entire 
damages. To rule otherwise would be to give Quintek the 
benefit of its breach. 
61T. 100-101. 
62Even if it were assumed that Herm Hughes would not take 
the discount, damages can be calculated as the difference 
between what Herm Hughes paid for the trusses, together with 
freight charges, and the contract price without the discount. 
That figure is $5,294.00. 
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CONCLUSION 
This is a Uniform Commercial Code case. Concepts of 
offer and acceptance were expanded by the Code to reflect the 
reality of the commercial market place, including construction 
projects. Quintek and Herm Hughes formed a contract for the 
sale of roof trusses. That contract includes the essential 
terms of sale, even though not all of the terms of the 
supplier agreement were part of the contract. That contract 
was formed either by the bid proposal of Quintek and the 
supplier agreement of Herm Hughes, or by the conduct of those 
parties that recognized the existence of a contract. 
There was a contract, and there was a breach. Because 
Quintek failed to supply the trusses, Herm Hughes obtained a 
substitute supplier at a higher cost. The difference between 
the cost of cover and the contract price is Herm Hughes's 
damage. 
Herm Hughes asks this Court to reverse the decision of 
the trial court and to award Herm Hughes damages in the amount 
of $8,695.44, together with its costs below and on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of June, 1991. 
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON 
(UuAfo jO&u 
Clark B. Fetzer^ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. 
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similarity of relevant provisions of former 
§§ 60-1-1 to 60-6-5 (Uniform Sales Act) to this 
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PART 1 
SHORT TITLE, GENERAL CONSTRUCTION 
AND SUBJECT MATTER 
70A-2-101. Short title. 
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code 
— Sales. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-101. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Uniform Com-
mercial Code in Utah, 9 Utah L Rev 904. 
Kentucky Law Journal. — Uniform Com-
mercial Code — Major Changes in Sales Law, 
49 Ky L. J. 165 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of UCC 
Art. 2, dealing with sales, 17 A.L.R.3d 1010 
70A-2-102. Scope — Certain security and other transac-
tions excluded from this chapter. 
Unless the context otherwise requires, this chapter applies to transactions 
in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an 
unconditional cc ltract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a 
security transaction nor does this chapter impair or repeal any statute regu-
lating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-102. 
Cross-References. — Secured transactions, 
sales of accounts, contract rights and chattel 
paper, §§ 70A-9-101 to 70A-9-507 





Implied distributorship agreement 
Inapplicable to livestock auction 
Services 
Conditional sale. 
Where conditional sales contract provided 
that title to the goods was to remain in seller 
until payment of the purchase price and al-
lowed the seller to repossess in the event of 
default, the seller had two concurrent reme-
dies He was entitled to the purchase price if he 
could collect and if he could not collect he re-
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tamed the title to his property and the right to der the Code, the court can infer aspects of an 
its possession He did not waive his right to agreement from the parties' course of perfor-
reclaim the property by bringing suit for the mance Quality Performance Lines v Yoho Au-
purchase price Soter v Snyder, 3 Utah 2d 28, tomotive, Inc , 609 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1980) 
277 P.2d 966 (1954) (decided under former 
}aw) Inapplicable to livestock auction. 
In replevin action by livestock grower to re-
"Goods." cover cattle sold at auction, sale was not gov-
Split distributorship. erned by this chapter but by Utah Livestock 
An alleged split distributorship, the primary B r a n d a n d Anti-Theft Act (Chapter 24 of Title 
purpose of which was to entitle a plaintiff to 4> P u £ h v Stratton, 22 Utah 2d 190, 450 P.2d 
perform the service of selling the defendant's 463 (1969) 
products, did not come within the ambit of this Qe r vices 
chapter Beehive Bnck Co v Robmson Bnck ^ ^
 h transaction, in goods, 
Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct App 1989)
 n f l t B e m ( ^ ff ^ ^ p r e d o m l n a t e S ; an*d t h e 
Implied distributorship agreement transfer of title to personal property is only an 
Although a distributorship agreement is incidental feature of the transaction, the con-
more involved than a typical sales contract, it tract does not fall withm the ambit of this 
is subject to Utah's Uniform Commercial Code chapter. Beehive Brick Co v. Robinson Brick 
if its primary purpose is the sale of goods, un- Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur 2d Sales § 5. 
70A-2-103. Definitions and index of definitions. 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) "Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods. 
(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and 
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the 
trade. 
(c) "Receipt" of goods means taking physical possession of them. 
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods. 
(2) Other definitions applying to this chapter or to specified parts the 
thereof, and the sections in which they appear are: 
"Acceptance." Section 70A-2-606. 
"Banker's credit." Section 70A-2-325. 
"Between merchants." Section 70A-2-104. 
"Cancellation." Section 70A-2-106(4). 
"Commercial unit." Section 70A-2-105. 
"Confirmed credit." Section 70A-2-325. 
"Conforming to contract." Section 70A-2-106. 
"Contract for sale." Section 70A-2-106. 
"Cover." Section 70A-2-712. 
"Entrusting." Section 70A-2-403. 
"Financing agency." Section 70A-2-104. 
"Future goods." Section 70A-2-105. 
"Goods." Section 70A-2-105. 
"Identification." Section 70A-2-501. 
"Installment contract." Section 70A-2-612. 
"Letter of Credit." Section 70A-2-325. 
"Lot." Section 70A-2-105. 
"Merchant." Section 70A-2-104. 
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"Overseas." Section 70A-2-323. 
"Person in position of seller." Section 70A-2-707. 
"Present sale." Section 70A-2-106. 
"Sale." Section 70A-2-106. 
"Sale on approval." Section 70A-2-326. 
"Sale or return." Section 70A-2-326. 
"Termination." Section 70A-2-106. 
(3) The following definitions in other chapters apply to this chapter: 
"Check." Section 70A-3-104. 
"Consignee." Section 70A-7-102. 
"Consignor." Section 70A-7-102. 
"Consumer goods." Section 70A-9-109. 
"Dishonor." Section 70A-3-507. 
"Draft." Section 70A-3-104. 
(4) In addition Chapter 1 contains general definitions and principles of 
construction and interpretation applicable throughout this chapter. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-103. Delegation of performance, § 70A-2-210. 
Cross-References. — Assignment of rights, 
§ 70A-2-210. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Contract for work, labor and materials. tract for work, labor and materials. Sidney Ste-
The former Uniform Sales Act did not ex- vens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264, 67 
pand the law of sales to include a transaction p.2d 632, 111 A.L.R. 331 (1937). 
that was not a contract of sale, such as a con-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §§ 13, Key Numbers. — Sales «=» 1, 3; Statutes <*» 
14, 16, 21, 22. 179. 
C.J.S. — 77 C J.S. Sales § 1; 82 C.J.S. Stat-
utes § 315. 
70A-2-104. Definitions — "Merchant" — "Between mer-
chants" — "Financing agency," 
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise 
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge 
or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other 
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowl-
edge or skill. 
(2) "Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or other person 
who in the ordinary course of business makes advances against goods or docu-
ments of title or who by arrangement with either the seller or the buyer 
intervenes in ordinary course to make or collect payment due or claimed 
under the contract for sale, as by purchasing or paying the seller's draft or 
making advances against it or by merely taking it for collection whether or 
not documents of title accompany the draft. "Financing agency" includes also 
a bank or other person who similarly intervenes between persons who are in 
the position of seller and buyer in respect to the goods (Section 70A-2-707). 
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(3) "Between merchants" means in any transaction with respect to which 
both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-104. sales of accounts, contract rights and chattel 
Cross-References. — Secured transactions, paper, §§ 70A-9-101 to 70A-9-507. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Farmer not a merchant such regularity as to be a substantial part of 
The term "merchant" refers primarily to one their occupation, but it does not include a 
whose occupation is buying and selling; this farmer who sells his crops annually. Lish v. 
definition does not exclude persons who sell Compton, 547 P.2d 223 (Utah 1976). 
products they make or raise if this is done with 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Sales § 1 et seq.; 82 
C.J.S Statutes § 315. 
A.L.R. — Farmers as "merchants" within 
provisions of UCC Article 2, dealing with sales, 
95 A.L.R.3d 484. 
Key Numbers. — Sales «=» 1 et seq.; Stat-
utes «= 179. 
70A-2-105. Definitions — Transferability — "Goods" — 
"Future" goods — "Lot" — "Commercial unit." 
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) 
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other 
than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 
8) and things in action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals 
and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty (Section 
70A-2-107). 
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest m them 
can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. 
A purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as 
a contract to sell. 
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods. 
(4) An undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible goods k sufficiently 
identified to be sold although the quantity of the bulk is not determined. Any 
agreed proportion of such a bulk or any quantity thereof agreed upon by 
number, weight or other measure may to the extent of the seller's interest in 
the ta lk be sold to the buyer who then becomes an owner in common. 
(5) "Lot" means a parcel or a single article which is the subject matter of a 
separate sale or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the con-
tract. 
(6) "Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by commercial usage 
is a single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs 
its character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a 
single article (as a machine) or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an 
assortment of sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other 
unit treated in use or in the relevant market as a single whole. 
Michigan Law Review. — Commercial 
Law — A Farmer Is Not a Merchant Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 
345. 
Am. Jur, 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §§ 24, 
64, 66, 68. 
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The former Uniform Sales Act did not ex-
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-105. Investment securities, §§ 70A-8-101 to 
Cross-References. — "Fungible" goods de- 70A-8-408. 
fined, § 70A-1-20K17). 
Identification of goods, insurable interest, 
§ 70A-2-501. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS gamated Sugar Co., 72 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 
1934) (decided before adoption of Uniform 
Sale of goods and passage of title. Commercial Code). 
Scope. 
Sale of goods and passage of title. ^nf8*! 
The fact that sugar under contract of sale , , , ,. , ^^ , 
was stored in different warehouses used in op- P a n d t h e l a w o f s a l e s to m c l u d e a transaction 
eration of business did not render inapplicable t h a t w a s n o t a contract of sale, such as a con-
ordinary rules respecting sale and passage of t r a c t f o r w o r k > l a b o r a n d materials. Sidney Ste-
title to part of fungible property without sepa- vens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264, 67 
ration or segregation. United States v. Amal- P2d 632, 111 A.L.R. 331 (1937). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §§ 32, visions of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 
45. on Sales, 48 A.L.R.3d 1060. 
C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Sales § 14; 82 C.J.S. Stat- Conveyance of land as including mature but 
utes § 315. unharvested crops, 51 A.L.R.4th 1263. 
A.L.R. — Electricity, gas, or water fur- Key Numbers. — Sales «=» 11; Statutes *=» 
nished by public utility as "goods" within pro- 179. 
70A-2-106. Definitions — "Contract" — "Agreement" — 
"Contract for sale" — "Sale" — "Present sale" — 
"Conforming" to contract — "Termination" — 
"Cancellation." 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and 
"agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of 
goods. "Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and a contract 
to sell goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the 
seller to the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). / "present sale" means a 
sale which is accomplished by the making of the contract. 
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are "conforming" 
or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations 
under the contract. 
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by 
agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On 
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are dis-
charged but any right based on prior breach or performance survives. 
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for 
breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except 
that the canceling party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole 
contract or any unperformed balance. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-106. Cross-References. — Course of dealing and 
usage of trade, § 70A-1-205. 
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Course of performance or practical construe- Interparty agreements, Chapter 3 of Title 
tion, § 70A-2-208. 15. 
Improper tender or delivery, cure by seller, Obligation of good faith in performance or 
§ 70A-2-508. enforcement of contract, § 70A-1-203. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Western Coop. Hatcheries, 242 F.2d 567 (10th 
Cir. 1957) (decided under former law). 
Executory and executed contracts distin- The intention of the parties at the time of the 
guished. transaction is the controlling factor of whether 
Intention of parties. or not title passed. The great weight of the evi-
Termination. dence in this case is that the transactions be-
_ _ _ _. . tween canneries and growers in reference to 
Executory and executed contracts distin-
 p i c k i n g W s m n o t s a l e s E c 0 1 s e n C o v 
guished. State Tax Comm'n, 109 Utah 563,168 P.2d 324 
Whether a contract is one of sale or an execu-
 ( 1 9 4 6 ) ( d e c i d e d b e f o r e adoption of Uniform 
tory contract to sell depends always upon what Commercial Code). 
the parties to it intend in regard to the time Essence of sale is transfer of title from seller 
when the title in the property is to pass to the
 to buyer. Union Portland Cement Co. v. State 
buyer. Jones v. Commercial Inv. Trust, 64
 T a x Comm'n, 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164 
Utah 151, 228 P. 896 (1924) (decided before (1946). 
adoption of Uniform Commercial Code). 
Termination. 
Intention of parties. Termination of relationship between re-
Where turkey poults were placed .with builder of automotive components and ware-
growers by processor pursuant to written house distributor did not destroy latter's right, 
agreement between hatchery and processor, it implied from the parties' course of perfor-
was not a sale of the poults from hatchery to mance, to return brakeshoe cores to rebuilder 
processor. It was an agreement relating to for credit against brakeshoes it had obtained 
sales of poults from hatcheries to growers in from the rebuilder. Quality Performance Lines 
Utah to whom the poults would be distributed v. Yoho Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340 (Utah 
through processor. Nephi Processing Plant v. 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §§ 26, C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 1, 2. 
28 to 30. Key Numbers. — Sales «=» 1 et seq. 
70A-2-107. Goods to be severed from realty — Recording. 
(1) A contract for the sale of minerals or the like (including oil or gas) or a 
structure or its materials to be removed from realty is a contract for the sale of 
goods within this chapter if they are to be severed by the seller but until 
severance a purported present sale thereof which is not effective as a transfer 
of an interest in land is effective only as a contract to sell. 
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of growing crops or other 
things attached to realty and capable of severance without material harm 
thereto but not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be cut is a contract 
for the sale of goods within this chapter whether the subject matter is to be 
severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at 
the time of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present 
sale before severance. 
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third party rights pro-
vided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for sale may be 
executed and recorded as a document transferring an interest in land and 
shall then constitute notice to third parties of the buyer's rights under the 
contract for sale. 
38 
70A-2-203 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-202. 
Cros9-References. — Exclusion or modifi-
cation of warranties, § 70A-2-316 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Finality of written expression 
Sales tax payment 
Finality of written expression. 
Where parties orally agreed to sale of certain 
used railroad materials salvaged from fifteen 
miles of track, purchaser sent seller purchase 
order containing specifications for the mate-
rials, seller signed the order, after inspecting 
the track purchaser sent new purchase orders 
with different specifications, seller neither 
signed nor objected to the new orders, and pur-
chaser accepted materials not conforming to 
any of the orders, the purchase orders were 
clearly not intended by the parties to be a com-
plete and exclusive statement of the terms per-
taining to quantity and dimension Durbano 
Metals, Inc v A & K R R Materials, Inc , 574 
P 2d 1159 (Utah 1978) 
Sales tax payment 
Prime contractor did not succeed in placing 
burden of paying sales taxes on materialman 
by showing trade usage or course of dealing 
where record showed the parties were not en-
gaged in the same trade or business and that 
the custom varied from trade to trade, and 
where the evidence of a previous transaction 
by the parties was not conclusive Ralph Child 
Constr Co v United States, 365 F.2d 841 
(10th Cir 1966) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §§ 74 
to 79 
C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 910; 77 C.J S 
Sales § 71 
A.L.R. — Application of parol evidence rule 
of UCC § 2-202 where fraud or misrepresenta-
tion is claimed in sale of goods, 71 A.L.R.3d 
1059 
Affirmations or representations made after 
Sale is closed as basis of warranty under UCC 
§ 2-313(l)(a), 47 A.L.R 4th 200 
Key Numbers. — Evidence «=» 397,400,413; 
Sa\es «=» 60. 
70A-2-203. Seals inoperative. 
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a contract for sale or an offer 
to buy or sell goods does not constitute the writing a sealed instrument and 
the law with respect to sealed instruments does not apply to such a contract or 
offer. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-203. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales 
§§ 105, 106 
70A-2-204. Formation in general. 
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to 
show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the exis-
tence of such a contract. 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found 
even though the moment of its making is undetermined. 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not 
fail for indefmiteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and 
there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 
42 
SALES 70A-2-206 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-204. Unconscionable contract or clause, 
Cross-References. — Open terms, § 70A-2-302. 
§§ 70A-2-305 to 70A-2-311. 
Supplementary general principles of law ap-
plicable, § 70A-1-103. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Delivery. after failing to agree to a suggested financing 
View that contract to be valid and enforce- plan, gave the dealer a check on which he 
able had to have been delivered was a mis- wrote that the check was to be held until the 
taken view of the law since delivery is not nee- buyer secured a loan for the amount and then 
essary in the absence of an express intention. stopped payment on the check the next day, 
Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., the parties failed to complete a contract since 
456 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1972). there was no definite meeting of the minds J. 
Where the original order signed by the pro- Golden Barton Motor Co. v. Jackson, 9 Utah 2d 
spective buyer of an automobile was changed 210, 341 P.2d 423 (1959) (decided under former 
by the dealer's sales manager and the buyer, law). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 35. 
C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 1, 5, 24 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Sales «=» 1(1), 22 et seq. 
70A-2-205. Firm offers. 
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its 
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of * 
consideration, during the time sfated or if no time is stated for a reasonable 
time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months; 
but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be 
separately signed by the offeror. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-205. 
Cross-References. — Rules of construction, 
variation by agreement, § 70A-1-102. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 138. 
70A-2-206. Offer and acceptance in formation of contract. 
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circum-
stances 
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting accep-
tance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circum-
stances; 
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment 
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to 
ship or by the prompt or current shipment of nonconforming goods, but 
such a shipment of nonconforming goods does not constitute an accep-
tance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is 
offered only as an accommodation to the buyer. 
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(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable mode of 
acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable 
time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-206. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 140. 
C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 1, 5, 24 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Sales «=> 1(1), 22, 23. 
70A-2-207. Additional terms in acceptance or confirma-
tion. 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confir-
mation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even 
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed 
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the addi-
tional or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given 
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is 
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties 
do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular 
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, 
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sions of this act. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-207. 
Cross-References. — Acceptance of goods 
by buyer, effect, § 70A-2-607. 
Adequate assurance of performance, right to, 
§ 70A-2-609. 
Contractual modification or limitation of 
remedy, § 70A-2-719. 
Installment contracts, § 70A-2-612. 
Liquidation or limitation of damages, 
§ 70A-2-718. 
Transactions between merchant., 
§ 70A-2-104. 
Unconscionable contract or clause, 
§ 70A-2-302. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Attorney fees. 
Addition to the sales receipt (treated by par-
ties as an "acceptance or a written confirma-
tion") of a provision for attorney fees materi-
ally altered the offer within meaning of Sub-
section (2)(b) and thus did not become effective 
by virtue of offeror's silence as to the added 
provision; seller could not recover attorney fees 
in subsequent action on open account. Johnson 





Northwestern University Law Review. — C.J.S. — 77 C J S Sales §§ 1, 5, 29. 
Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 and A.L.R. — What are additional terms maten-
the "Counter Offer", Acceptance Unlimited?, ally altering contract within meaning of UCC 
57 Nw U.L. Rev. 677 § 2-207(2)(b), 72 A.L.R.3d 479. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales §§ 153 Key Numbers. — Sales «=» 1, 22(4), 23(4). 
to 174. 
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical construc-
tion. 
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance 
by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportu-
nity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or 
acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of 
the agreement. 
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course of perfor-
mance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed 
whenever reasonable as consistent with each other; but when such construc-
tion is unreasonable, express terms shall control course of performance and 
course of performance shall control both course of dealing and usage of trade 
(Section 70A-1-205). 
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and waiver, 
such course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification 
of any term inconsistent with such course of performance. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-208. Waiver of buyer's objections, § 70A-2-605. 
Cross-References. — Acceptance of goods, 
effect, § 70A-2-607. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS implied from the parties' course of perfor-
mance, to return brakeshoe cores to rebuilder 
Implied distributorship agreement. for credit against amount owed to the re-
Interest on unpaid balance builder Quality Performance Lines v Yoho 
T i- J J- x_ii- x i_- * Automotive, Inc., 609 P2d 1340 (Utah 1980). 
Implied distributorship agreement. 
Although a distributorship agreement is Interest on unpaid balance. 
more involved than a typical sales contract, it Where seller altered form of sales receipt m 
is subject to Utah's Uniform Commercial Code, 1973 to provide for interest on unpaid balance 
under the Code, the court can imply aspects of of account and buyer thereafter received state-
smen an agreement from the parties' course of ments including interest charges and made 
performance Quality Performance Lines v payments without objection until August 1978, 
Yoho Automotive, Inc., 609 P 2d 1340 (Utah a course of conduct, dealing or performance 
1980) was established as a matter of law, so that 
Termination of relationship between re- entry of summary judgment on interest issue 
builder of automotive components and ware- was proper Johnson Tire Serv , Inc. v. Thorn, 
house distributor did not destroy latter's right, Inc., 613 P.2d 521 (Utah 1980). 
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70A-2-710. Seller's incidental damages. 
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reason-
able charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the 
transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connec-
tion with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-710. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Damages incidental to resale. 
A., r Seller had no right to damages incidental to 
D a n c e s incidental to resale. resale where buyer failed to make payment af-
ter delivery and seller had not retained a secu-
A t f?f n e y r S ' ^ . i J n tY interest in the goods nor had any right to 
Attorney fees being consequential damages,
 ess b m e a n s o f s e l f . h e l B u l l o c k v> J o e 




 A : ~ c o f t n n j o o c ^ u L m ^ 
dental damages. Johnson Tire Serv , Inc. v. B a i l e y A u c t l o n C o " 5 8 0 R 2 d 2 2 5 ( U t a h 1 9 7 8 ) ' 
Thorn, Inc., 613 P 2d 521 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 67A Am Jur. 2d Sales C.J.S. — 78 C.J.S. Sales § 477 et seq. 
§§ 997 to 1000, 1099. Key Numbers. — Sales *=> 370, 384, 391(1). 
70A-2-711. Buyer's remedies in general — Buyer's security 
interest in rejected goods. 
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer right-
fully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods 
involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole con-
tract (Section 70A-2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has 
done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid 
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods 
affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or 
(b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter (Sec-
tion 70A-2-713). 
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also 
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this 
chapter (Section 70A-2-502); or 
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as 
provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-716). 
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has 
a security interest m goods in his possession or control for any payments made 
on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, re-
ceipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and resell 
them in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 70A-2-706). 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-711. Installment contract, § 70A-2-612 
Cross-References. — Buyer's rights on im- Remedies liberally administered, § 70A-Im-
proper delivery, § 70A-2-601 106 
Cure by seller of improper tender or delivery, Revocation of acceptance in whole or m part, 
§ 70A-2-508 § 70A-2-608 
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Rightfully rejected goods, merchant buyers 
duties, § 70A-2-603 
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Answer and counterclaim of buyer 
Choice of remedies 
Defense of breach of warranty 
Lien of buyer 
Measure of damages 
Notice of breach of warranty 
Rescission 
Waiver 
Answer and counterclaim of buyer. 
Buyer, instead of bringing independent ac-
tion for breach of warranty, may interpose 
counterclaim in action by seller for purchase 
price Detroit Vapor Stove Co v J C Weeter 
Lumber Co , 61 Utah 503, 215 P 995, 29 
A L R 659 (1923), Detroit Vapor Stove Co v 
Farmers' Cash Union, 61 Utah 567, 216 P 
1075 (1923) (decided under prior law) 
Choice of remedies. 
Though on breach of warranty of an automo-
bile the buyer might have sued for the differ-
ence between the value of the car in the condi-
tion warranted and its value m the condition 
in which it was sold, he might rescind instead 
and recover back the purchase price 
Studebaker Bros Co v Anderson, 50 Utah 
319, 167 P 663 (1917) (decided under prior 
law) 
Defense of breach of warranty. 
It is elementary that stipulations m warran-
ties are conditions precedent to reliance upon 
breach in action by seller for purchase price 
Stipulations with regard to return of article 
must be complied with Consolidated Wagon & 
Mach Co v Barben, 46 Utah 377, 150 P 949 
(1915) (decided under prior law) 
Lien of buyer. 
Buyer has no lien on goods for amount of 
purchase price paid thereon unless there has 
been a breach of warranty (express or implied) 
on the part of the seller Sammis v Marks, 69 
Utah 26, 252 P 270 (1926) (decided under prior 
law) 
Measure of damages. 
Where brick was sold by sample, consti-
tuting express warranty, measure of damages 
was the loss resulting in the ordinary course of 
events from the breach of warranty Jorgensen 
v Gessell Pressed Brick Co , 45 Utah 31, 141 
P 460, 1917C Ann Cas 309 (1914) (decided 
under prior law) 
Representatives of processor of live turkeys 
induced purchase of turkey poults by grower to 
raise them for market Diseased poults were 
DECISIONS 
delivered to purchaser and processor, on being 
notified, advised retention by grower and pre-
scribed medical treatment Damages recover-
able by purchaser for breach of warranty as to 
fitness of poults should have included expense 
of reducing loss from disease and profit lost by 
purchaser Nephi Processing Plant, Inc v 
Talbott, 247 F 2d 771 (10th Cir 1957) (decided 
under prior law) 
Notice of breach of warranty. 
Notice of breach of warranty must be given 
in manner provided by contract, as it is condi-
tion precedent to reliance on warranty Notice 
to agent was held not to be notice to seller 
Consolidated Wagon & Mach Co v Barben, 46 
Utah 377, 150 P 949 (1915), Advance-Rumely 
Thresher Co , Inc v Stohl, 75 Utah 124, 283 P 
731 (1929) (decided under prior law) 
Rescission. 
Buyer must exercise his right of rescission 
within a reasonable time Smith v Columbus 
Buggy Co , 40 Utah 580, 123 P 580 (1912) (de-
cided under prior law) 
The return of property in substantially the 
same condition m which it was received is con-
dition precedent to rescission, unless changed 
condition is result of breach of warranty Sum-
mers v Provo Foundry & Mach Co , 53 Utah 
320, 178 P 916 (1919) (decided under prior 
law) 
Upon rescission, buyer is entitled to return 
of all payments made Heichemer v Peterson, 
75 Utah 107, 283 P 435 (1929) (decided under 
prior law) 
Whether there has been a rescission is a 
question of fact Knudsen Music Co v 
Masterson, 121 Utah 252, 240 P 2d 973 (1952) 
(decided under prior law) 
Under former Uniform Sales Act, buyer 
could rescind executed sale for breach of war-
ranty Ernest E Fadler Co v Hesser, 166 F 2d 
904 (10th Cir 1948) 
Waiver. 
A buyer did not waive his right to rescind 
the purchase of an automobile for breach of 
warranty that it would run by repeatedly tak-
ing it back for adjustment and repairs, because 
nothing more was intended than to offer the 
seller ample opportunity to put the car in con-
dition so that it would run Studebaker Bros 
Co v Anderson, 50 Utah 319, 167 P 663 
(1917) (decided under prior law) 
Buyer may waive his right to rescind by con-
duct inconsistent with exercise of such right 
Advance-Rumely Thresher Co v Stohl, 75 
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Utah 124, 283 P. 731 (1929) (decided under 
prior law). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Yale Law Journal. — Remedies for Breach Am. Jur. 2d. — 67A Am. Jur. 2d Sales 
of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods un- §§ 1164 to 1174, 1232, 1289. 
der the Uniform Commercial Code; A Roadmap C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Sales § 94; 78 C.J.S. 
for Article Two, Ellen A. Peters, 73 Yale L. J. Sales § 486 et seq. 
199. Key Numbers. — Sales «=» 113, 390 et seq. 
70A-2-712. "Cover" — Buyer's procurement of substitute 
goods. 
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by 
making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable pur-
chase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the 
seller. 
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference be-
tween the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or 
consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 70A-2-715), but less 
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. 
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him 
from any other remedy. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-712. Reasonable time, § 70A-1-204. 
Cross-References. — Obligation of good 
faith, § 70A-1-203. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67A Am. Jur. 2d Sales chasing goods elsewhere on seller's breach un-
§§ 1171 to 1177, 1289. der UCC § 2-712, 64 A.L.R.Sd 246. 
C.J.S. — 78 C.J.S. Sales § 548. Key Numbers. — Sales «=> 418(7). 
A.L.R. — Buyer's right to "cover" by pur-
70A-2-713. Buyer's damages for nondelivery or repudia-
tion. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of market 
price (Section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or repudia-
tion by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when 
the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any 
incidental and consequential damages provided in this chapter (Section 
70A-2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. 
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of 
rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-713. 
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RULING 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HERB HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
A Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
QUINTEK, A Utah Corporation 
R U L I N G 
Case No. 883000004 
Plaintiff was the general contractor on a school building 
project, and defendant a manufacturer and supplier of roof trusses 
who provided plaintiff with a written cost estimate for supplying 
trusses for the project. That cost estimate contained a provision 
that it be accepted within 10 days of its date, and also contained a 
blank space for such acceptance to be endorsed therin with the date. 
The written cost estimate was never accepted by any endorsement 
theron by plaintiff or its agents. A suppliers agreement bearing 
date of November 15, 1983, appears to have been submitted to 
defendant by plaintiff sometime near the end of that month, but 
defendant found its terms unacceptable and so advised plaintiff. The 
project went forward with plaintiff believing it had a firm agreement 
for the trusses, and defendant protesting that it could not proceed 
with the ordering of materials and the manufacturing of the trusses 
until it had an acceptance of its cost estimate as submitted. It 
appears that each party persisted in its own position, with some 
exchanges between them, until February, 1984, when defendant refused 
to proceed further. This action was filed in August 1984, and has 
been languishing in the district court and then the circuit court 
ever since. 
Plaintiff'sCdmtentions seems to be that even if no acceptance was 
endorsed on defendant's cost estimate, the ensuing conduct and course 
of dealing between the parties showed an acceptance and binding 
agreement between them. 
The written documents submitted as evidence, mostly generated 
by the plaintiff, can be viewed as supporting plaintiff's position; 
but much of the oral testimony received by the court tends to offer 
plausible explanations for the course of dealing between the 
parties. Obviously, the passage of over six years since these events 
took place causes additional problems. The one fact that comes 
through this haze is that the original cost estimate had no 
acceptance endorsed on it within the ten ^ays^reguir^d by its terms, 
and there is no document showing acceptance i«o£iiiS^hat period of 
time. Certainly plaintiff could^^^asily met the conditions 
requested and avoided all the problems which have ensued. 
a 
& 
Viewing all of the evidence together/ this court is unable to 
conclude that plaintiff has established its case by a preponderance 
thereof. Accordingly/ the court concludes that plaintiffs claim 
should be dismissed. 
Dated: September 10, 1990 
)J*± ,v 
Robert J. Sumsion 
Circuit Court Judge 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Ruling ws mailed, postage prepaid/ on this 14th day of September/ 
1990 to the following parties. 
E. Nordell Weeks# Esq, Attorney for the Plaintiff/ 320 Kearns 
Building, 136 South Main Street/ Salt Lake City/ UT 84101 
David Lambert, Attorney for the Defense, P 0 BOX 778/ Provo, UT 
84603 
Kristine Christianson 
Circuit Court Clerk 
h 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
^ /* 
• ' / 
^ y , 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
P:quin-fof.lo 
Our File No. 15,669 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 883000004 
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th day 
of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuu Judge. Plaintiffs president, 
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks. 
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its 
attorney, D. David Lambert. The Court received the evidence of the parties and has considered 
the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and now makes the 
following: 
^ \ 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff corporation is a general contractor doing business within the 
State of Utah. 
2. The defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of manufacturing roof 
trusses and other building components which are supplied as finished products without doing 
work on the job site. 
3. In late October, 1983, the defendant became aware of the possibility of bidding 
on the Midland Elementary School to be constructed in Roy, Utah. This information came 
through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service, and an agent of the defendant corporation 
reviewed the materials available through the service. Defendant prepared an estimate of its cost 
to provide roof trusses for the school in question. 
4. On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to plaintiff by telephone a bid 
proposal which had been reduced to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same day that 
the verbal communication took place. 
5. Plaintiff received the defendant's written bid proposal on October 27, 1983, 
as indicated by its date stamp placed thereon. Said document was received by the Court as 
Exhibit 6. 
6. Defendant's written bid proposal, (Exhibit 6) specified that the offer was to be 
accepted within ten days and provided a space at the bottom of the written document for 
plaintiff to sign in acceptance. 
7. Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the defendant and did not 
communicate with defendant until late November, 1983. 
2 
8. Larry Gilson, of Oscar E. Chytraus Co., prepared and submitted to plaintiff 
a bid for the trusses which are the subject of the plaintiffs claims. After the bid openings he 
was asked by plaintiff to meet and Mr. Gilson attended a meeting at the plaintiffs office. 
During that meeting Mr. Gilson was asked by plaintiff to reduce his bid proposal. After the 
meeting, Larry Gilson contacted defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, and advised Mr. 
Jacobson that in his opinion plaintiff was bid shopping the Quintek bid. 
9. The only written response of the plaintiff which directly addressed the terms 
of the bid proposal was made under cover letter dated November 21, 1983, and was in the form 
of a Supplier Agreement. The cover letter and Supplier Agreement were received by the Court 
as Exhibit 11. Exhibit 20, containing the notes of Don Brown, an employee of the defendant, 
gives reason to believe that Exhibit 11 was received by the defendant on or about November 
30, 1983. 
10. Defendant refused to sign the Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) and shortly after 
receiving the supplier agreement, defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had discussions with 
Todd Walker, an employee of the plaintiff, stating his refusal to sign the Supplier Agreement. 
11. The Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) contains various terms which are different 
than the defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), including the following terms: 
a. Specific terms concerning indemnification; 
b. Specific terms about assuming direct obligations to the owner; 
c. Language allowing the contractor to retain 10% of the purchase price 
until completion of the project; and 
d. Provisions concerning liquidated damages. 
3 
12. Certain shop drawings were done preliminary to defendant's submission of 
the bid proposal to the plaintiff. It is unclear if those same drawings were later submitted to 
plaintiff, but a drawing (Exhibit 13) was sent and discussions occurred relative to possible 
performance by defendant in fabricating the trusses in question. 
13. Defendant never began fabrication of the trusses and never produced any of 
the trusses for the school in question. 
The Court having made the above Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff failed to carry its burden to establish that there was an agreement 
between the parties. 
2. Plaintiffs Supplier Agreement was belated and untimely and did not create a 
contract. 
3. Plaintiffs conduct concerning the Oscar Chytraus bid was communicated to 
the defendant and made the defendant justifiably suspicious about the plaintiffs intentions. This 
fact, coupled with the failure of the plaintiff to act in a timely manner to confirm an agreement 
convinced the court that an agreement between the parties was never concluded. 
4. Defendant acted promptly and reasonably to notify the plaintiff that it rejected 
the terms proposed in the supplier agreement. 
5. No partial performance occurred in that no aspect of the final product to be 
supplied was ever fabricated, no step of fabrication, except a preliminary drawing, was ever 
commenced, plaintiff never accepted or received any goods and plaintiff paid no monies to 
defendant. 
4 
6. The supplier agreement sent to defendant by the plaintiff, in addition to being 
untimely, was materially different than defendant's original proposal. 
7. Defendant's efforts to pursue an agreement with the plaintiff after its offer 
expired does not constitute a waiver or otherwise convince the court that an agreement was ever 
reached. 
8. Plaintiff alleged only a cause of action for breach of contract and no estoppel 
or reliance claims were pleaded or proven. 
9. Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed with prejudice-with costs to defendant. 
DATED this O day of December, 1990. • v v 





I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this / ( / day of December, 1990. 
Clark B.Fetzer, Esq. 
Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson 
175 South Main Street 
700 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
JUDGMENT 
F 1 I E D JAN1 3 1991 
u o* * .- LAMBERT (1872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
P:quinjud.jh 
Our File No. 1 5,669 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
SI A l b OF U1AU, ORhM DEPARTMENT 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, IK 
a Utah corporation, 
II "1 a in I iff, 
vs 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
j UDGJVlt 
Civil No. 883000004 
The abo\ e-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial o n ^ e i V \a\ 
of August, 1990, before the Hon, Robert J Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff's president, 
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel II Wn-n ks 
Defendant's presidenl, J .cobson, was present and defendant » . cpie^.led h1, us 
attorney, D Da ^  id Lambert. The Court having received the evidence . /*< es, h*i\ ing 
considered the arguments of counsel, together with the lq,»al authorities presenter! and having 
p r e v io u s ly m a c entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of I 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. There * minds 01 apmnwil Ixlv rem Ihe pan IIILW 
2. ' I he plaintiff 's case is dismissed, with prejudice. 
3. Defendant is awarded costs in the sum ' i^j.uO. 
1 )A 11.1' this ••-' day of Becember, IWIft. 
BY THE COURT: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I herebv ,t*rtif\ tiur, le and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
Clark B. Fetzer, Esq. 
Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson 
700 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
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Salt Lake Ci ty, Ut. 84104 
PeI I a Intermounta i n 
P.O. Box 548 
8 02 0 South 13 00 West 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Qu i ntek 
P.O. Box 76 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Idea I Ready Mi x 
P. O. Box 267 










Terminix International, Inc, 
49 W. Benton 
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486-9207 waIt 
CYCLORAMA: 
FIRE EXT INC/CAB I NETS: 
Evans Supply 
509 West 300 North 
Salt Lake Ci ty, Ut. 84116 
Densley S Associates 
P.O. Box 566 







Alder ' s 
960 South Main St. 
Salt Lake Ci ty, Ut. 84102 
Architectural Specia Ities,Inc 
2476 West Directors Row 
Salt Lake Ci ty, Ut. 84104 
Had ley Products Company 
6812 Enchanted Drive 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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/O \ UJMKALI WUKK^Httl 
JOB. NO. 3 35 NAME MIDLAND ELEMENTARY DATE 
SUBCONTRACTOR: OjlZX^ 
ADDRESS ££ZE£?nt 
e ^ 2 P - , _ _ U X ZIP POPE «£Wkftl 
TELEPHONE I£SL'3§1SL^ CONTACT Q > „ Br*^~ 
WORK DESCRIPTION__ t J a J "7?^6<^S 
COST CODE (zZSJJKZZZZT^ 
As set f o r t h in the General Cond i t ions and Genera l Requirements. 
D i v i s i o n 1 and D i v i s i o n _ £ . MacA.1 PU*r 
Section A a ^ . ^ . ^ i - L ^ t A i L ^ ^ ^ S ^ ~< ' „V , U ; S ^ £. " 
aTong witH AddenBuin 1 o7 tfie specTTTcatTons and as indicated on the 
drawings of JOHN L. PIERS A.I.A.. Including but not limited to: 
4hcid£bL£L—£^ill££JL--^d&i*f ds> QkLir office ^j'.f/.'.iA 
• ^ • . y , ? lc*. _ 
Amou 
Beqin - £ , / , Lr-^ttfk Complete by * (Ze£. SOT,/-£%&> 
EXHIBIT 11 
fc\mcMi n C2^3 
HERM HUGHES & SONS INC. GENERAL CONTRACTORS 
P.O. Box 256 1650 West 500 South 
Phone (801) 292-1411 West Bountiful, Utah 84087 
November 2 1 , 1983 Pit Exhibit 
Quintek 
P. 0. Box 76 
Provo, Utah 84601 
RE: MIDLAND ELEMENTARY SCHOOL / Roy, Utah 
Gentlemen: 
We are enclosing two copies of the agreement for the above 
project. Please sign and return one copy to our office as 
soon as possible. 
Please prepare your monthly estimates as follows: 
1. Submit invoices to our office no later than 
the 15th of the month. 
2. Contract amount: 
% work completed to date 
less 10% retainage 
Amount earned to date 
Less previous payments^ 
Net due this estimate 
3. Shop drawings and/or color samples must be in our 
office within two weeks of the date of this letter 
so that we can forward them to the Architect for 
approval. 
Sincerely, 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC. 
Todd Walker 
Project Manager 
This AGREEMENT maoe this l^^Jl_ a a y o f Novemb^e£ in the year of N i n e t e e n H u n d r e d 
anc Eighty Three b \ and between HERM Hl'TTRT3_ & S0_NJ5 , J^NCj, h e r e i n a f t e r called the 
C o n t r a c t o r and 01MN1EK h e r e i n a f t e r c a We d~ t H e "S u p"pl"!"e"r for the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
MJ_DLAND_E^EMENTA^T3TT[50L for WEBEP^SCHOO^C^STRj^CT^ h e r e i n a f t e r c a l l e d the O w n e r . 
W I T N E S S E T H , that the Supplier and C o n t r a c t o r for c o n s i d e r a t i o n h e r e i n a f t e r named 
agree e b f o i l o w s : 
S E C ION 1. It is agreed tnat the Supplier shall be bound to the C o n t r a c t o r 
by the terms of the General C o n t r a c t , tne General C o n d i t i o n s , Special C o n d i t i o n s , 
D r a w i n g s , A d d e n d u m 1 and S p e c i f i c a t i o n s for MIDLAND E L E M E N T A R Y . He shall a s s u m e 
toward the C o n t r a c t o r all o b l i g a t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s that the C o n t r a c t o r , by 
these d o c u m e n t s , assumes toward the Owner, although the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d C o n t r a c t 
D o c u m e n t s are not attached h e r e t o , they shall become a part of this A g r e e m e n t . It 
is a s s u m e c , that the S u p p l i e r is familiar with the terms and r e q u i r e m e n t s set 
fortr t h e r e i n . 
SECTION 2. It is agreed that the m a t e r i a l s to be furnished FOB j o b s i t e a r e : 
As set forth in the General C o n d i t i o n s and General R e q u i r e m e n t s , D i v i s i o n 1 and 
D i v i s i o n 6, WOOD & P L A S T I C , S e c t i o n 6 0 1 0 - L u m b e r & related items as it p e r t a i n s to 
wooc trusses along with A d d e n d u m 1 of the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s and as i n d i c a t e d on the 
d r a w i n g s of J0HjN^^.j; f^J,^^^ A I A. Including but not limited to: 
1 . All p r e f a b r i c a t e d metal plate wood t r u s s e s m a n u f a c t u r e d in an J.C.B.O. 
approved shop. 
2 . Submit six (6) copies shop d r a w i n g s with registered structural e n g i n e e r 
stamp to our office w i t h i n two (2) w e e k s . 
FOB j o b s i t e a d d r e s s as f o l l o w s : 4 8 0 0 South 3100 West / Roy, Utah 
SECTION 3. It is agreed that the C o n t r a c t o r shall pay to the S u p p l i e r for 
the s a t i s f a c t o r y c o m p l e t i o n of all m a t e r i a l s furnished the sum of FORTY TWO 
T H 0 U S A N D _ F J ^ _ J ^ N D J ? E D _ E J _ G H 1 1 ^ 1 - 2 °i i A R 3 _ A_ND_ JV0 CE J ^ ] ± _ i $ ± 2 A j H 8 . 002 i nc l"udl ng™a~TT 
state" ancT T T c a T s a l e " and" u"se taxes i n ~mon"tFiT" payment's o f ^ Q ^ o f the m a t e r i a l s 
f u r n i s h e d in any preceding m o n t h , in a c c o r d a n c e with e s t i m a t e s p r e p a r e d by the 
S u p p l i e r and as approved by the C o n t r a c t o r , HERM HUGHES & S O N S , INC, the a r c h i t e c t 
and O w n e r ; such payments to be made as p a y m e n t s are received by the C o n t r a c t o r 
from the 0 w n e r covering the m o n t h l y e s t i m a t e s of the C o n t r a c t o r , i n c l u d i n g the 
a p p r o v e c portion of the S u p p l i e r ' s monthly e s t i m a t e as o u t l i n e d in the General 
C o n d i t i o n s of the c o n t r a c t . Final payment to be made as such p a y m e n t is r e c e i v e d 
by the C o n t r a c t o r from the O w n e r . Supplier shall p r o v i d e a p p r o p r i a t e lien 
r e l e a s e s as required by the c o n t r a c t o r . 
SECTION 4. The S u p p l i e r a g r e e s to reimburse the C o n t r a c t o r for any and all 
l i q u i d a t e d d a m a g e s that may be assessed against and c o l l e c t e d from the C o n t r a c t o r 
by the O w n e r , which are a t t r i b u t a b l e to or caused by the S u p p l i e r s f a i l u r e to 
f u r n i s h the m a t e r i a l s and perform the work required by this a g r e e m e n t w i t h i n the 
time fixed in the manner p r o v i d e d for h e r e i n . The Supplier also a g r e e s to pay to 
the C o n t r a c t o r such other or additional damages as the C o n t r a c t o r may sustain by 
reason of such delay by the S u p p l i e r . The pa >ment of such d a m a g e s shall not 
r e l e a s e the S u p p l i e r from his o b l i g a t i o n to o t h e r w i s e fully p e r f o r m this S u p p l i e r 
A g r e e m e n t . In the event of a d i s p u t e or d e l a y , C o n t r a c t o r has the right to 
p r o v i d e the material and adjust the contract price a c c o r d i n g l y . S u p p l i e r shall 
a 1 $'• pay r e a s o n a b l e legal fees n e c e s s a r y for the e n f o r c e m e n t of this a g r e e m e n t . 
SECTION 5. It is agreed that the S u p p l i e r shall be r e s p o n s i b l e to p r e p a r e 
<jnc to obtain approval of all n e c e s s a r y shop d r a w i n g s as to not cause delay in the 
p r o g r e s s of c o n s t r u c t i o n of the subject p r o j e c t . 
SECTION 6. It is agreed that the S u p p l i e r shall be r e s p o n s i b l e for the 
a c c u r a c y of their shop d r a w i n g s to c o i n c i d e with the A r c h i t e c t ' s d r a w i n g s . 
SECTION 7, In lieu of r e t a i n a g e required by the C o n t r a c t o r , S u p p l i e r a g r e e s 
to allow a d i s c o u n t of Q% ten days to the C o n t r a c t o r , 
IN W I T N E S S W H E R E O F the p a r t i e s h e r e t o have e x e c u t e d this A g r e e m e n t , the day and 
year first above w r i t t e n . 
S U P P L I E R : 
0 U I N T E K 
P. 0. Box 76 
P r o v o , Utah 84601 
By: 
FOB j o b s i t e adoress as f o l l o w s : 4 8 C 0 South 3100 West / Ro>, Utah 
S E C T I O N 3 . It is agreed that the C o n t r a c t o r shall pay to the S u p p l i e r for 
the s a t i s f a c t o r y c o m p l e t i o n of all m a t e r i a l s f u r n i s h e d the sum of £2.51.X_—D" ^  
2 HO us AN D _ n ,Yi__H '11DJ*JJL_LLQ.H L!LL^ J22 J=i *£2_ A!iL JiP 9.1tiLL-liiti J i l l e • °52 inciudmc afT 
s t a t e "anc" T~o c a ^" s a"T"e~ and" use taxes in mont nTy "payments o f"S£~ of the m a t e r i a l s 
f u r n i s h e d in any p r e c e d i n g montr, , in a c c o r d a n c e with e s t i m a t e s p r e p a r e d by the 
S u p p l i e r and as a p p r o v e d by the C o n t r a c t o r , HERM H U C H E S & S O M S , INC, the a r c h i t e c t 
and O w n e r ; such p a y m e n t s to b*1 meae as payments are r e c e i v e d by the C o n t r a c t o r 
from the 0 w n e ~ c o v e r i n g the m o n t h l y e s t i m a t e s of the C o n t r a c t o r , i n c l u d i n g the 
a p p r o v e d p o r t i o n cf the S u p p l i e r ' s monthly e s t i m a t e as o u t l i n e d in the Ge n e r a l 
C o n d i t i o n s of the c o r t r a c t . Fine"! payment to be made as such p a y m e n t is r e c e i v e d 
by the C o n t r a c t o r from the O w n e r . S u p p l i e r s h a 1 1 p r o v i d e a p p r o p r i a t e lien 
r e l e a s e s as required by the c o n t r a c t o r . 
S E C T I O N *t. The S u p p l i e r a g r e e s to r e i m b u r s e the C o n t r a c t o r for any and all 
l i q u i d a t e d d a m a g e s that may be assessed against and c o l l e c t e d from the C o n t r a c t o r 
by the O w n e r , which are a t t r i b u t a b l e to or caused by the S u p p l i e r ' s f a i l u r e to 
f u r n i s h the .materials and p e r f o r m the work required by this a g r e e m e n t w i t h i n the 
t i m e fixec in the fncnne r p r o v i d e d for h e r e i n . The S u p p l i e r also a g r e e s to pay to 
the C o n t r a c t o r sucn other or add i t i o n a l d a m a g e s as the C o n t r a c t o r may s u s t a i n by 
r e a s o n of such delay by the S u p p l i e r . The p a y m e n t of such d a m a g e s shall not 
r e l e a s e the S u p p l i e r from his o b l i g a t i o n to o t h e r w i s e fully p e r f o r m this S u p p l i e r 
A g r e e m e n t . In the event of a dispu t e or d e l a y , C o n t r a c t o r has the right to 
p r o v i d e the mater i a l and ad j u s t the contract price a c c o r d i n g l y . S u p p l i e r shall 
a 1 s' oay r e a s o n a b l e legal fees n e c e s s a r y for the e n f o r c e m e n t of this a g r e e m e n t . 
S E C T I O N 5. It is agreed that the S u p p l i e r shall be r e s p o n s i b l e to p r e p a r e 
one to o b t a i n approval of all n e c e s s a r y shop d r a w i n g s as to not c a u s e delay in the 
p r o g r e s s of c o n s t r u c t i o n cf the subject p r o j e c t , 
S E C T I O N 6. It is agr e e d that the S u p p l i e r shall be r e s p o n s i b l e for the 
a c c u r a c y of their shop d r a w i n g s to coi n c i d e with the A r c h i t e c t ' s d r a w i n g s . 
S E C T I O N 7. In lieu of r e t a i n a g e required by the C o n t r a c t o r , S u p p l i e r a g r e e s 
to a l l o w a d i s c o u n t of B% ten days to the C o n t r a c t o r . 
IN W I T N E S S W H E R E O F the p a r t i e s h e r e t o have e x e c u t e d this A g r e e m e n t , the day and 
ye a r first a b o v e w r i t t e n . 
S U P P L I E R : 
O U I N T E K 
P. 0. Box 76 
P r o v o , Utah 84601 
By ? 
CONTRACTOR: 
HERM HUCHES ARSONS,* INC. 
1650 West 500 / South; 
W ^ - B o u n t i f ylM^-titah 1/84 087 
m i t r t . S"ecre" taFy /TTeaTurer 
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EXHIBIT 13 
P O Box 76, Provo, Utah, 84601 
December 13, 1983 
Herm Hughes and Sons Inc. 
P. O. Box 256 
1650 West 500 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84087 
Re: drawing for Midland Elementary School. 
Dear Sirs, 
Please find the enclosed sealed drawings for the 
above mentioned project. Please note the approval state-
ment on each drawing as fabrication will not begin 
until a signed and dated copy of each drawing is returned 
to our office. 
Thank you for this opportunity to serve you. 
Jacobson 
k\ ) hand delivered O O Mailed/ 






by r j ^ r f f i ^ ^ — 
{ ; A p p r o v e d 
( ) Not a p p r o v e d 
( ) A p p r o v e d as cor. r e e l e d 
( ) R e v i s e and s u b m i t , n o t e c h a n g e s La/ ^ b vta% 
Q u i n t e k I n c . s u b m i t s s e a l e d d r a w i n g s o n l y f o r c o n f o r m a n c e w i t h t h e 
d e s i g n c o n c e p t o f t h e p r o j e c t a n d c o m p l i a n c e w i t h s t a t e d r e q u e s t i n 
t h e c o n t r a c t d o c u m e n t s . G e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r i s r e s p o n s i b l e t o v e r i f y 
t h a t d i m e n s i o n i n g o f t h e e n c l o s e d d r a w i n g i s a c c u r a t e and t r u e . 
d a t e G e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r 
d
^ t e . A r c h i t e c t ^ ~ t i t l e 
-3J-X Df^fc/v LQ4D 
P:/J T 
t i t l e 
Q u i n t e k I n c . 0 . Box 76 P r o v o , U t a h 84603 8 0 1 - 3 7 7 - 0 9 0 7 
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EXHIBIT 16 
JOHN L. PIERS, A.I.A., Architect 
- A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION -
JOHN L PIERS, A.I.A., Architect 
KENNETH E. HASENOEHRl, Associate Architect 
2726 Harrison Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
n 4ei2M -tfvjj'-'-s ^ z^iA^p Date: ; \ -• r_ 
Re: M i O L - * } l l > 




HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC. 
General Contractors 
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EXHIBIT 19 
PROPOSAL i C\ 
SUPPLIER AGREEMENT 
P.O.Box 76, Provo, Utah, 84601 
This AGREEMENT made this 22nd day of Febuary 1984 by and between 
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. heeinafter called the owner and Quintex Inc. 
hereinafter called the Supplier. 
Witnesseth, that the supplier and the contractor for consideration hereinafter 
named agress as follows: 
Section 1. It is agreed that the materials to be furnished FOB jobsite on the 
truck. 
As set forth in the general conditions and general requirements, Divisions 
1 and Division 6, WDOD & PLASTIC, Section 6010-lurtiber & related items as it 
pertains to wood trusses along with the specifications and as indicated on 
the drawings of John L. Piers AIA. 
1. all prefabricated metal plate wood trusses manfactured in an 
I.B.C.O. approved shop. 
2. submit six (6) copies shop dreawing with a registered civil 
engineer stamp to Herm Hughes & Sons within two (2) weeks of receipt 
of supplier agreement. 
FOB JOBSITE ADDRESS AS FOLLOWS: 4800 South 3100 West Roy, Utah 
Section 2. It is agreed that the contractor shall pay to the supplier 
for the satisfoctory conpletion of all materials furnished the sum of ffourty 
Eight Thousand and no cents (48,000.00),tax not included FOB jobsite on the truck. 
Supplier agress to allow a disoount-of eight (8) percent, net ten (10) days, 
from invoice date. The date of invoice shall be the conpletion date of fabrication. 
The creation of a new supplier's agreement is made necessary for the following 
reasons: (1) Bid date was October 25,1983. Unforseen delays to both the 
contractor and all the suppliers have made accepted the bid prices untenable. 
(2) Materials cost have risen dramatically from the bid date of four months ago. 
(3) Production scheduling for fabrication is becoming questionable. 
Approaching the busiest production time period of the entire year will 
necessitate increased production costs for a project which should have aireaay 
been fabricated and delivered. 
(4) Contractor also agrees to condition of sale clause on the Quintek invoice. 
OCWIRACTOR: SUPPLIER: 
QUINTEK INC V 
cjfZM— 
By. 
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